DataShield Ontology v2.2.0

The governed data plane for AI

Ontology is agent-led MDM. It's the governed data plane your agents query. We find the PII and PHI in your data. Then we swap it for tokens at ingest. We widen the quasi-identifiers. So no one row stands out. Your agents get answers, not identifiers. To turn a token back, you need the right. That right is never the default.

We tokenize datasets at ingest. Agents then query that tokenized data over MCP. Detokenization is a special, audited act.

PII tokenization at ingest: the same token every time, joins still work, and you can turn it back under policy

Tokenization happens at ingest, one dataset at a time. We swap each identifier for a token. It carries a TOK_ prefix. The token comes from an HMAC. So it stays the same each time. The same value always maps to the same token. That means joins across datasets still work. The raw value itself never reaches the query path.

The token vault makes tokenization reversible under policy. Detokenization is a special, audited act. We gate and log it, like any other governed call. One-way redaction can't do that. Redact a field once, and you lose it. Gone for every later use. Reversible tokenization is the pseudonymization pattern. EU regulators name it as a GDPR fix (EDPB Opinion 28/2024).

Erasure is crypto-shred. Throw away the key data. The tokens can never come back. The audit chain lives on, whole.

Tokenized data changes your breach math An exfiltrated raw-PII dataset is a notifiable trove of identifiers with full breach-notification and fine exposure; an exfiltrated tokenized dataset is a token set, not identifiers - and EU regulators (EDPB 28/2024) name pseudonymization as a GDPR mitigation before an incident. Join-preserving tokens keep analytics and entity resolution working. IF THE DATA PLANE IS BREACHED Raw PII dataset exfiltrated → a notifiable trove of identifiers full breach-notification and fine exposure Tokenized dataset exfiltrated → a token set, not identifiers EDPB 28/2024: regulators name pseudonymization as a GDPR mitigation - before an incident Same value → same token joins and entity resolution still work - analytics intact Smaller blast radius. Lower notification and fine exposure. The data stays useful.

Agent-led MDM and PHI de-identification: classification, quasi-identifiers, golden records

PII/PHI classification and fingerprinting

We scan each dataset at ingest. We label fields as NAME, DOB, MRN, and the rest. Then we fingerprint them. So tokenization works on what the data really is. Access policy does too. Not on the name at the top of the column.

Quasi-identifier generalization

We generalize quasi-identifiers to a configured k. A birth date turns into a decade. A ZIP turns into a region. No one can pin a tokenized row on a person. Not by lining up its fields.

RAG and golden records, governed

RAG retrieval and MDM golden-record mastering run together. Same data plane. Both run over the same tokenized data. They use the same access rules. Those rules know what each field is. They use the same dataset lifecycle controls, too.

The DataShield Analytical DB: analytics over MCP

Agents query governed Parquet datasets over MCP. They go through the DataShield Analytical DB. It ships built in. They get the full SQL they'd get on raw data. But we tokenize the data first. Auth meters each query. It seals each one into the audit chain.

Performance sidebar: 175M rows in 627ms on the DataShield Analytical DB. The method is in the engineering blog. That test measures the query path. Tokenization happens at ingest, not per query.

Want docs, agent definitions and skills served to agents with the same rules? See Corpus, now shipped.

Agent-led MDM is what makes the analytical DB trustworthy. Governed agents master the golden records it serves. A human steward handles the exceptions.

Warehouse-class analytics, no warehouse bill The DataShield Analytical DB queries 175.8 million rows in 627ms on a single VPS, with no separate database to license or run. Queries stay metered and sealed into the audit chain, and benchmark numbers are published with hardware and warm/cold state or not at all. ANALYTICS IN THE GOVERNED PLANE 627ms to query 175.8M rows DataShield Analytical DB · on one VPS No separate database to license or run Queries stay metered and sealed into the audit chain Cold + warm numbers published with hardware - or not at all Warehouse-class speed at the cost of a file on disk. No warehouse bill.

Questions data teams ask first

What is agent-led master data management?

It is MDM where an agent builds it with you. Not a consultant who builds it for you. The agent talks to a business user. It drafts a spec. Then it walks you through a decision gate. Each proposal says what it does, and why. It says what it hits, too. And what else you could pick. You confirm it, or you overrule it. One transaction writes the entity types and hierarchies. It also writes draft match configs and reference bindings. Validation rules land in the same draft. The agent never promotes a config. It never runs resolution on its own.

How does tokenization at ingest protect PII and PHI?

We swap each identifier for a token. This happens as the dataset lands. The raw values never reach the query path. The same value always maps to the same token. So joins still work. Detokenization is a special, audited act, not a default. Throw away the key data. The tokens can never come back. The audit chain stays whole.

Tokenize PII before it reaches the LLM A data flow for tokenizing PII before it reaches an LLM. Raw PII such as name, SSN, and card number is classified and tokenized at ingest. The agent and LLM see only tokens. Detokenization is a separate privileged, audited, least-privilege vault operation. Because the agent works on tokens, a leak yields tokens rather than identities, the same breach with a far smaller blast radius. TOKENIZE PII BEFORE THE LLM The agent works on tokens. Raw PII never enters the prompt. Raw PII name, SSN, card Tokenize at ingest classify + replace Agent / LLM sees tokens only Detokenize = privileged vault op audited, least-privilege A leak yields tokens, not identities. Same breach, far smaller blast radius.

Ontology v2.2.0 is in production. Authorization and evidence come from Auth. Agent sessions run from Commander.

Tokenize at ingest. Query it over MCP. Detokenize only under audit. On your own kit, with your own keys.

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